Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Question

Abstract

Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize self-interested agents to truthfully report their signals even in the absence of verification by comparing agents’ reports with their peers. We propose two new mechanisms, Source and Target Differential Peer Prediction, and prove very strong guarantees for a very general setting. Our Differential Peer Prediction mechanisms are strongly truthful : Truth-telling is a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Also, truth-telling pays strictly higher than any other equilibria, excluding permutation equilibria, which pays the same amount as truth-telling. The guarantees hold for asymmetric priors among agents, which the mechanisms need not know ( detail-free ) in the single question setting . Moreover, they only require three agents , each of which submits a single item report : two report their signals (answers), and the other reports her forecast (prediction of one of the other agent’s reports). Our proof technique is straightforward, conceptually motivated, and turns on the logarithmic scoring rule’s special properties. Moreover, we can recast the Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism [ 20 ] into our framework. We can also extend our results to the setting of continuous signals with a slightly weaker guarantee on the optimality of the truthful equilibrium.