A Constant Factor Prophet Inequality for Online Combinatorial Auctions-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A Constant Factor Prophet Inequality for Online Combinatorial Auctions

Published:2023-06-02 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
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Author:

Correa José¹,Cristi Andrés¹

Affiliation:

1. University of Chile, Chile

Funder

Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo

Meta

Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, University of California Berkeley

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3564246.3585151

Reference26 articles.

1. Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions: Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier

2. Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders

3. Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information

4. M. Babaiof , B. Lucier , N. Nisan , R. Paes Leme . On the eficiency of the walrasian mechanism . EC 2014. M. Babaiof, B. Lucier, N. Nisan, R. Paes Leme. On the eficiency of the walrasian mechanism. EC 2014.

5. E. Baldwin , P. Klemperer . Understanding preferences: “demand types ”, and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities. Econometrica 87 ( 3 ): 867-932, 2019 . E. Baldwin, P. Klemperer. Understanding preferences:“demand types”, and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities. Econometrica 87 ( 3 ): 867-932, 2019.

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