The China in foreign policy of the US president Richard Nixon administration (january-february 1969)

Abstract

The article investigates the formation of the foreign policy course of US President Richard M. Nixon on China in January-February 1969. The practical implementation of pre-election initiatives by the administration of President Richard M. Nixon in the Chinese direction in January-February 1969 was studied. There were analyzed reasons, course and consequences of the intensification of Washington's foreign policy strategy toward Beijing during the investigated period. The role of various groups in the American establishment in the process of forming the foreign policy course of the new administration towards China in January-February 1969 is outlined. It describes the specific US foreign policy actions towards communist China at the beginning of Richard M. Nixon's presidential period. Despite the presence in the political, academic, and social circles of the United States of certain attitudes in favor of the recognition of the People's Republic of China as the political reality of international life, the question of the legal recognition of China in the second half of the 1960s constantly moved to the background. The victory of Richard М. Nixon in the presidential election in 1968 was accompanied by a series of changes in the system of geopolitical and military priorities of the United States. The new administration’s more realistic approach to China was due primarily to the fact that Beijing, which renounced its alliances and claimed the role of a «third force», was a strong player in the international arena. Moreover, the policy of Kennedy–Johnson did not justify itself, as China has intensified its foreign policy, and established relations with many countries, including the US allies. At the beginning of the presidency of Richard М. Nixon, in January-February 1969, his administration managed to quickly develop and begin to implement a holistic concept of «new policy» for China. His Chinese policy was inextricably linked to the US foreign policy in Asia and reflected the clash of American and Chinese interests in the region. At the same time, the representatives of the American establishment had a clear idea of how they could influence Soviet-Chinese relations in order to deepen the rift between the USSR and China and what concrete benefits they could derive from this. A number of objective and subjective factors did not prevent the administration of the 37th President of the United States, Richard М. Nixon, radically changing Washington’s Chinese policy. Communist China continued to be recognized as a powerful factor in the US-Soviet dialogue. In spite of this, in the late 60s of the twentieth century, the objective preconditions began to evolve gradually, which promoted the normalization of US-China relations in the future and allowed to resolve most of the controversial issues that ultimately led to the international recognition of the People’s Republic of China by the United States of America.