FROM A WILLING GOOD COP TO A RELUCTANT BAD COP: THE (D)EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA

Abstract

This study posits that the ineffective and futile efforts of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to contain North Korean nuclear ambition are a result of the United States (U.S.) consistently and strategically developing its sanctions regimes, rather than the limited implementation of the UNSC’s measures or by the non-compliance of China and Russia, the two North Korean-leaning permanent UNSC members. The U.S/ has endeavoured to maximise its strategic leverage against North Korea by consolidating bilateral channels to increase its foreign policy capacity and flexibility, instead of reinforcing multilateral pressures through the UNSC. Although both the U.S. and the UNSC share the goal of nuclear non-proliferation in Northeast Asia, the former deliberately exploited the deficient decision making process of the latter to maximise its foreign policy flexibility. Consequently, the U.S. has flexibly pursued both engagement and containment of North Korea while maintaining its hard-line stance against it at the UNSC, whereas the UNSC’s sanctions on North Korea have gradually become rigid and inflexible, without achieving tangible outcomes. We argue that the U.S.’s unilateral use of sanctions against North Korea is building on its instrumental use of the UNSC’s multilateral framework, which has significantly lost its legitimacy and effectiveness amid the looming U.S.-China rivalry over hegemony in Asia.