Asymmetric Political Representation and Fiscal Redistribution

Abstract

This article demonstrates how the formation of new federations with power asymmetries, such as Canada at the time of Confederation—its constitutional moment—led to asymmetric representation, also referred to as malapportionment. The same power asymmetries that led to asymmetric representation also led to fiscal redistribution in which some sub-national jurisdictions obtained a share of federal government spending that was disproportionate to their share of the country’s population or their contribution toward federal government revenues. This article makes use of historical institutionalism to demonstrate that Confederation can best be viewed as a critical juncture and treats Canada as a case study in which both political malapportionment and fiscal redistribution were part of the initial federal bargain. It also shows how path dependence ensures that both malapportionment and fiscal redistribution have been persistent features of the Canadian federation and have become accentuated over time. Malapportionment is measured using the Loosemore-Hanby index of electoral disproportionality, as adapted by David Samuels and Richard Snyder. This permits comparisons between institutions, including the House of Commons and Senate, various caucuses within those institutions, and the federal cabinet. It also permits comparisons between jurisdictions and between different time periods. Fiscal redistribution is measured using Statistics Canada estimates of spending by the federal government in each province and territory and the amount of revenue it collects in those same jurisdictions. Progressive forms of taxation, direct spending by the federal government, and intergovernmental grants have all expanded exponentially and have led to increased fiscal redistribution.