Abstract
Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is an FDA-approved treatment for symptoms of motor disorders—with experimental use for psychiatric disorders. DBS, however, causes a variety of side effects. Moral philosophers question DBS’s influence on users’ experiences of authenticity, identity, and/or autonomy. These characterizations of DBS, however, may not make sense of how DBS complicates, rather than simply impedes or bolsters, users’ abilities to exercise agency. Empirical work exploring DBS users’ lived-experiences and feminist accounts of relational autonomy demonstrate that the issues users face are better characterized in terms of the user’s relationship to their stimulator, that is, in terms of “relational agency.”
Publisher
University of Toronto Press Inc. (UTPress)
Subject
Philosophy,Health (social science),Gender Studies
Cited by
5 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献