How presuppositions and illocutionary force become components of sense: some implications from the analysis of fictitious names in Frege’s philosophy

Abstract

Frege's fictitious names possess meaning but lack denotation. Both these names and the sentences containing them are deemed fictitious. Since any proper name can potentially refer to an imaginary entity, it is crucial to consider the speaker's intention. When making a statement, the speaker may refer to the real or the imaginary. In the latter case, the thought cannot be explicitly expressed, and consequently, denotation cannot be reached. In Frege's framework, fictional thoughts hold little significance for decision-making and actions. There­fore, we consistently seek to discern whether the discourse pertains to the real or the imagi­nary. To make this knowledge accessible, it must be incorporated into the content of a sen­tence, effectively becoming a thought. However, not every statement expresses a thought, even if it conforms to the structure of a sentence. I will now elucidate three intensionalization pro­cedures that Frege proposes for constructing a sentence that expresses a thought, even if cer­tain components within it lack denotation: the articulation of a naming relation, the formula­tion of a propositional attitude of intention, and the formulation of a propositional attitude that conveys a metafictional context. Through these methods, the speaker's intent to indicate a real or fictional object becomes a constituent of thought, i. e., the sense of the sentence. Fic­tions themselves become components of thought when they are found in an indirect context, wherein their sense serves as their denotation. When considered independently, the sense of a proper noun is an entity with a parameter that acquires a value in the specific situation where the name is employed by a particular speaker. Frege's foundational concepts are juxtaposed with certain aspects of Aristotle and Leibniz's doctrines.