Abstract
My aim in this paper is to explore some metaphysical and psychological implications of the (contentious) idealist interpretation of the belief in external objects ("bodies") Hume ascribes to us in the Treatise. More specifically, I will argue that the interpretation commits Hume to the claim that space is spatially fragmented, both synchronically and (even more so) diachronically, and renders Hume incapable of allowing for all the spatial thoughts we think we can have. But (perhaps surprisingly) it does not impugn Hume's view of causation.
Reference39 articles.
1. Anderson, R. F. (1976). The Location, Extension, Shape, and Size ofHume’s Perceptions. In D. W. Livingston & J. T. King (Eds.), Hume – ARe-Evaluation (pp. 153–171). Fordham University Press.
2. Annand, M. R. (1930). An Examination of Hume’s Theory of Relations. TheMonist, 40(4), 581–597. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist19304047
3. Baxter, D. L. M. (2007). Hume’s Difficulty. Time and Identity in theTreatise. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203940259
4. Bennett, J. (1971). Locke, Berkeley, Hume. Central Themes. OxfordUniversity Press.
5. Berkeley, G. (1710). A Treatise Concerning the Principles of HumanKnowledge. Aaron Rhames.