Abstract
Susanna Schellenberg has presented several arguments for the "situation-dependency thesis" (SDT), i.e. the claim that (visual) perceptual experiences are necessarily situation-dependent, insofar as they represent objects' situation-dependent properties. In my critical response to her paper, I focus on her argument from the "epistemic dependence thesis" (EDT), according to which "perceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties is epistemically dependent on representations of the relevant situation-dependent properties" (Schellenberg 2008, 75). I consider what support she musters for EDT, so as to make an objection to her argument from EDT. To address this objection (or, rather, to bypass it), I will re-formulate the EDT, as a different but closely related thesis that I will call EDT*, informed by the admittedly radical Husserlian view that perception is epistemically rational.
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