Abstract
Is it possible to be happy without virtues? At least for the kind of enduring human happiness Aristotle bears, virtues are required (NE, I). In addition to virtues, some prosperity is necessary for flourishing, like having friends and minimal external goods. Nowadays, we witness different approaches to happiness – well-being – focusing on mental states – i. e. affective – usually without reference to moral issues, concretely moral dispositions, or virtues. At the crossroads of Philosophy and Psychology, the present article discusses the connection of happiness – well-being – and affective states by presenting Fredrickson’s theory of positive emotions, which has been criticised as approaching only hedonic well-being and therefore overlooking its eudaimonic aspects. In her approach, there is no reference to the good life connected to the human good, as in Aristotle’s ethics. However, there is instead an understanding of becoming a benevolent, a better person as a necessary human aspiration.
Publisher
National Documentation Centre (EKT)
Reference44 articles.
1. Abbà, Giuseppe. Felicità, vita buona e virtù. Saggio di filosofia morale. Roma: LAS, 1995.
2. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics; Magna Moralia; Eudemian Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995.
3. Arnold, Magda. Emotion and Personality. Volume 1, and 2. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.
4. Catalino, Lahnna, Sara Algoe, and Barbara Fredrickson. “Prioritising Positivity: An Effective Approach to Pursuing Happiness?” Emotion 14, no. 6 (2014): 1155-1161. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038029.
5. Catalino, Lahnna, and Barbara Fredrickson. “A Tuesday in the Life of a Flourisher: The Role of Positive Emotional Reactivity in Optimal Mental Health.” Emotion 11, no. 4 (2011): 938-950. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024889.
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献