Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low-Carbon Transformation of Construction Enterprises Under the "Dual Carbon" Target

Abstract

Purpose: This study aims to investigate the impacts of different choices made by construction enterprises, government, and the public on the low-carbon transformation of Chinese construction enterprises in the context of the global climate crisis.   Theoretical framework: The main theoretical foundation of this research is the theory of dynamic evolutionary games, it can aptly reflects the dynamic evolutionary process of strategy choices by various stakeholders during the promotion of low-carbon construction.   Method/design/approach: This study adopts a mixed-method approach involving literature review, qualitative analysis, and quantitative analysis. Firstly, a payoff matrix is constructed for the three stakeholders under different strategy choices. Then, the conditions under which different strategies tend to reach equilibrium are discussed. Finally, the stability of equilibrium solutions in evolutionary game is analyzed.   Results and conclusion: There are 7 equilibrium solutions that can be evolutionary stable strategies in specific situations. It is challenging for the system to achieve a progressively stable strategy when only one or two entities participate in low-carbon transformation.   Research implications: This study focuses on the background of the Chinese government's "dual carbon" target. It takes an innovative approach by considering the stakeholders in the low-carbon building supply chain, including the government and the general public, and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model for the low-carbon transformation of construction enterprises. This research makes a significant contribution to the future development of low-carbon buildings in China.   Originality/value:The results obtained in this study are unprecedented, innovative and relevant to the scientific community, in the context of sustainable development of low-carbon buildings.