Author:
Mengdi Peng,Puteh Fadilah,Kassim Asiyah
Abstract
The construction industry holds a pillar position in the national economy, but its efficiency paradox is increasingly prominent. An important finding of this study is that there is no contradictory relationship between contract incentives and contract adaptation in construction projects, that is, contract governance in construction projects can achieve both contract incentives and contract adaptation effects, both of which can promote project performance. This contradicts the opposing relationship between contract incentives and contract adaptation supported by existing research, which suggests that the enhancement of one effect always comes at the cost of the weakening of another effect.
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