What is the moral person like? An examination of the shared and unique perspectives on moral character

Abstract

AbstractObjectiveThe psychological profile of the moral person might depend on whose perspective is being used. Here, we decompose moral impressions into three components: (a) Shared Moral Character (shared variance across self‐ and informant reports), (b) Moral Identity (how a person uniquely views their morality), and (c) Moral Reputation (how others uniquely view that person's morality).MethodIn two samples (total N  = 458), we used an extended version of the Trait‐Reputation‐Identity model to examine the extent to which each perspective accounts for the overall variance in moral impressions and the degree to which social and personal outcomes were associated with each perspective, controlling for method variance (i.e., positivity and acquiescence bias).ResultsResults suggest that moral character impressions are strongly influenced by positivity and largely idiosyncratic. All components were related to higher levels of agreeableness. For the most part, however, the three components had unique correlates: people higher in Shared Moral Character tended to have higher standings on conscientiousness and honesty‐humility, were more respected, and donated more during an in‐lab game; people higher in Moral Identity endorsed various moral foundations to a greater extent; and people higher in Moral Reputation valued the loyalty foundation less.ConclusionThese results demonstrate the value of considering multiple perspectives when measuring moral character.