Rational Choice and Interpretive Evidence: Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place?

Abstract

Following Green and Shapiro's critique, debate about the value of rational choice theory has focused upon the question of its relationship to what we call ‘external’, largely quantitative, empirical evidence. We argue that what is most striking about rational choice theory is, however, its neglect of interpretive evidence. Our survey of 570 articles, published in the American Political Science Review and the American Journal of Political Science between 1984 and 2005 employing rational choice theory, revealed that only 139 made even the most cursory use of interpretive evidence. Does this matter? We argue that the absence of interpretive evidence undermines rational choice's explanatory credentials. However, we also argue that the admission of interpretive evidence risks rendering redundant the rational choice element of any explanation. This is the rock and the hard place between which rational choice is caught. In the final part of the article we distinguish those cases where rational choice may prove useful, namely those circumstances in which interpretive evidence either cannot be relied upon or does not subsume that which an explanation is intended to achieve.