Minority-Veto Referendums: An Alternative to Bicameralism?

Abstract

This article discusses minority-veto referendum mechanisms as an alternative to bicameralism. Based on an examination of such mechanisms in the Scottish National Party's draft constitution for Scotland and in the constitutions of Denmark and Latvia, the article argues that such minority-veto referendums are ‘constraining’ rather than ‘consensual’ devices – they enable the actions of the parliamentary majority to be restrained and checked, but do not guarantee protection to permanent socio-cultural minorities. Minority-veto referendums are also unable to perform the full range of functions that can be provided by a strong second chamber – they cannot replace second chambers as a means of representing wider public interests or bringing specialist advice to bear on legislative decisions. The article concludes with the view that minority-veto referendum mechanisms cannot be regarded as a comprehensive substitute for strong bicameralism in all cases, but that they can nevertheless provide a means of checking the power of parliamentary majorities, and are particularly suitable for small and relatively homogeneous countries.