Affiliation:
1. University College Dublin
2. University of Oxford
Abstract
This article tests the plausibility of an affect‐centered framework for foreign policy analysis, using the 2014 annexation of Crimea as an illustrative case. It identifies questions left open by prevailing accounts based on international relations theory and shows how a supplementary conceptual lens can improve existing explanations. The affective perspective suggests that the Russian president deemed intervention in Ukraine without alternative. Otherwise, Russia would have surrendered any claim to relevance in European security. More saliently, the ouster of Yanukovych, as a possible precedent for Russia, frightened Putin and increased his resolve to take action. Also, contrary to the interpretation of the annexation as an improvised reaction to a political crisis, evidence suggests that the Russian elite welcomed the opportunity to break free from uncomfortable partnership dynamics with the West.
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Philosophy,Sociology and Political Science,Clinical Psychology,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology,Social Psychology
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