Vertical collusion-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Vertical collusion

Published:2020-03 Issue:1 Volume:51 Page:133-157
ISSN:0741-6261
Container-title:The RAND Journal of Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:The RAND Journal of Economics

Author:

Gilo David¹,Yehezkel Yaron¹

Affiliation:

1. Tel Aviv University

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1756-2171.12308

Reference35 articles.

1. Raising Retailers’ Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals

2. Demand Signalling and Screening in Channels of Distribution

3. Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission.“Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors.” (2000) Available at:https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint‐venture‐hearings‐antitrust‐guidelines‐collaboration‐among‐competitors/ftcdojguidelines‐2.pdf at pp. 15–16 (last visited January 2016).

4. Multiple Messages to Retain Retailers: Signaling New Product Demand

5. Doyle C.andMartijn A.H.“Efficient Cartelization through Buyer Groups.” Working Paper no. 2009‐03 Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics University of Amsterdam (2012).

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