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The optimal allocation of decision and exit rights in organizations

  • Published:2017-05 Issue:2 Volume:48 Page:309-334
  • ISSN:0741-6261
  • Container-title:The RAND Journal of Economics
  • language:en
  • Short-container-title:The RAND Journal of Economics

Author:

Bester Helmut1,Krähmer Daniel2

Affiliation:

1. Free University Berlin

2. University of Bonn

Funder

German Science Foundation

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Reference48 articles.

1. Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives;Aghion;Review of Finance,2004

2. Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information;Aghion;Econometrica,1994

3. Formal and Real Authority in Organizations;Aghion;Journal of Political Economy,1997

4. When Does Coordination Require Centralization;Alonso;American Economic Review,2008

5. Optimal Delegation;Alonso;Review of Economic Studies,2008

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1. Insourcing versus outsourcing in a vertical structure;Journal of Economics & Management Strategy;2024-02-26

2. Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations;The RAND Journal of Economics;2023-02-13

3. Optimal Allocation and Scale Operation of Agricultural Machinery Based on Mathematical Planning Method;Recent Advances in Electrical & Electronic Engineering (Formerly Recent Patents on Electrical & Electronic Engineering);2021-11-29

4. On the delegation of authority;Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization;2021-11

5. Delegation and Strategic Silence;SSRN Electronic Journal;2020
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