Moral hazard and subsidized crop insurance-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Moral hazard and subsidized crop insurance

Published:2019-12-09 Issue:1 Volume:51 Page:131-142
ISSN:0169-5150
Container-title:Agricultural Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Agricultural Economics

Author:

Wu Shenan¹,Goodwin Barry K.²³,Coble Keith⁴

Affiliation:

1. PenFed Credit Union McLean Virginia USA

2. Department of Agricultural Economics North Carolina State University Raleigh North Carolina USA

3. Department of Economics North Carolina State University Raleigh North Carolina USA

4. Department of Agricultural Economics Mississippi State University Starkville Mississippi USA

Funder

U.S. Forest Service

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Agronomy and Crop Science

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/agec.12545

Reference27 articles.

1. Least squares after model selection in high-dimensional sparse models

2. Congressional Budget Office (CBO). (2019).USDA's mandatory farm programs–CBO's May 2019 baseline. Retrieved athttps://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019‐05/51317‐2019‐05‐usda_0.pdf.

3. An Expected‐Indemnity Approach to the Measurement of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance

4. The impacts of multiperil crop insurance on Indonesian rice farmers and production

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