STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH AN APPLICATION TO U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH AN APPLICATION TO U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS

Published:2021-02-12 Issue:3 Volume:62 Page:1011-1054
ISSN:0020-6598
Container-title:International Economic Review
language:en
Short-container-title:International Economic Review

Author:

Huang Yangguang¹,He Ming²

Affiliation:

1. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Hong Kong

2. University of Technology Sydney Australia

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/iere.12502

Reference84 articles.

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5. Identification of Standard Auction Models

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