Distortions in Eyewitnesses' Recollections: Can the Postidentification-Feedback Effect Be Moderated?

Abstract

Giving eyewitnesses confirming feedback after they make a lineup identification (e.g., “Good. You identified the actual suspect.”) inflates not only their recollections of how confident they were at the time of the identification, but also other testimony-relevant judgments, such as how good their view was, how much attention they paid during witnessing, and how quickly they identified the suspect. We replicated this postidentification-feedback effect with eyewitnesses who had made false identifications ( N = 156), adding critical conditions in which after the identification but prior to the feedback, some eyewitnesses were given instructions to privately think about their confidence, their view, and other matters. Other eyewitnesses were given the same thought instructions subsequent to the feedback manipulation. Prior thought served to mitigate the effects of feedback, but subsequent thought did not. In addition, even without feedback, privately thinking about confidence had some confidence-inflating properties of its own.