Multiple large shareholders and audit fees: Demand‐side evidence from China

Abstract

AbstractThis paper provides evidence on the role of multiple large shareholders (MLSs) in the determination of audit pricing from a new demand‐side perspective, rather than the typical supply‐side perspective. We find that for Chinese A‐share listed firms, the presence of MLS is associated with significantly higher audit fees. The results are robust after we address endogeneity concerns and use auditor choice as an alternative proxy to capture demand for auditing. Further tests show that audit fees increase with the number and relative power of noncontrolling large shareholders. The positive impact of MLS on audit fees is more pronounced for state‐owned enterprises (SOE) than in family‐owned enterprises. Moreover, this positive impact of MLS is more pronounced for SOEs with foreign blockholders and non‐SOEs with independent institutional blockholders. This positive impact is also more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry, severe agency problems and higher litigation risk. Overall, our results provide consistent evidence that firms with MLS are likely to demand high‐quality auditing, leading to higher audit fees.