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Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance

  • Published:2010-03 Issue:1 Volume:41 Page:139-164
  • ISSN:0741-6261
  • Container-title:The RAND Journal of Economics
  • language:en
  • Short-container-title:

Author:

Bonnet Céline,Dubois Pierre

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Reference46 articles.

1. Asker, J. “Measuring Cost Advantages from Exclusive Dealing: An Empirical Study of Beer Distribution.” Mimeo, New York University, 2004.

2. Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion;Bernheim;RAND Journal of Economics,1985

3. Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence;Bernheim;Quarterly Journal of Economics,1986

4. Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation;Berry;RAND Journal of Economics,1994

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1. Supply contracts under partial forward ownership;Journal of Economics & Management Strategy;2024-01-14

2. Double Marginalization, Market Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration;Journal of the European Economic Association;2023-11-21

3. Resale Price Maintenance in a Successive Monopoly Model*;The Journal of Industrial Economics;2023-11-20

4. Vertical Contracts and Downstream Entry*;The Journal of Industrial Economics;2023-11-14

5. Evaluating the Impact of Online Market Integration—Evidence from the EU Portable PC Market;American Economic Journal: Microeconomics;2023-11-01
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