1. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Held the civil rights act valid as applied to a 220-seat family-owned restaurant which received annually about $70,000 worth of food that had moved in commerce. It did not matter that the amount of food from sources outside the state was insignificant compared with the total food moving in commerce,id. at 298, and that Congress was not required to await the total dislocation of commerce before regulating. Id. at 300-301 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
2. 311 U.S. 377 (1940). The scope of the commerce power was considered in relation to conditions in licenses for the construction of hydroelectric dams; held, “it cannot properly be said that the constitutional power of the United States over its waters is limited to control for navigation…. [T]he authority of the United States is the regulation of commerce on its waters. Navigability… is but a part of this whole. Flood protection, watershed development, recovery of the cost of improvements through utilization of power are likewise parts of commerce control.”Id. at 426.
3. (2) Since the § 404 program is not likely to be found to preempt state programs on the same subject, a question clearly foreclosed against preemption in the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, Water Act § 404, is there need for a dual state-federal regulatory program, assuming that states could be persuaded to fulfill these regulatory responsibilities and administer wetlands programs? Could the same goals be achieved by state programs administered pursuant to federal standards? The answers to these questions also depend upon a better understanding of regional differences among wetlands and a better understanding of the kinds of wetlands and activities in wetlands that are most likely to have interstate effects.
4. Hawaii Const., art. X, § 3; see also 408 F. Supp. at 51.
5. Id.§§ 160-169A, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7470-7491.