Strategic channel decisions for the supplier and specialized e‐retailer in the presence of a third‐party marketplace

Author:

Sun Shuxiao1ORCID,Hu Huaqing2,Ge Zehui3,Li Yanlin4

Affiliation:

1. Newhuadu Business School Minjiang University No. 200 Xiyuangong Road Fuzhou 350108 P.R.China

2. Faculty of Business The Hong Kong Polytechnic University Hung Hom Kowloon, Hong Kong 999077 P.R.China

3. School of Economics and Management University of Science and Technology No.30 Xueyuan Road Beijing 100083 P.R.China

4. Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering The Hong Kong Polytechnic University Hunghom Kowloon, Hong Kong 999077 P.R.China

Abstract

AbstractWith the advancement of e‐commerce and the intensification of market competition, many suppliers have leveraged third‐party online marketplaces to expand their sales channels and bolster competitiveness. This poses potential threats to e‐retailers specializing in the core business of certain categories. This study examines a specialized e‐retailer's selling mode choice (reselling, in‐marketplace selling, or agency selling mode) and how this choice interacts with a supplier's channel strategy (marketplace, e‐retailer, or both/dual channels) in the presence of a third‐party marketplace. Our findings indicate that (1) the e‐retailer's optimal selling mode is contingent on the supplier's sales service quality and efficiency, and the e‐retailer's market occupation. Generally, when initially occupying a small market, the e‐retailer prefers selling in a third‐party marketplace, whereas when the initial market is relatively large, the e‐retailer is more inclined to opt for the reselling (agency selling) mode if the supplier's sales efficiency is low (high). Additionally, if the supplier's sales service quality is low, the e‐retailer will never choose the agency selling mode. (2) Exclusively introducing the marketplace channel is not the optimal choice for the supplier. Instead, adopting a dual channel is better when the direct selling cost is not too high. (3) Under certain scenarios, the supplier can manipulate the e‐retailer's channel by introducing the marketplace channel and offering a reference price without actually selling any products.

Funder

Natural Science Foundation of Fujian Province

Publisher

Wiley

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