Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids
Author:
Affiliation:
1. Université Paris Dauphine; LEDa, CEREMADE, and CIRANO
2. CERGE-EI
Funder
Governance and Regulation Chair
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Reference24 articles.
1. Strategic jump bidding in English auctions;Avery;Review of Economic Studies,1998
2. Promotion, turnover and preemptive wage offers;Bernhardt;American Economic Review,1993
3. Toeholds, bid jumps, and expected payoffs in takeovers;Betton;Review of Financial Studies,2000
4. Bhattacharyya 1992 ‘The analytics of takeover bidding: initial bids and their premia’
5. Strange bids: bidding behaviour in the United Kingdom's third generation spectrum auction;Börgers;Economic Journal,2005
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