Do family ownership and control influence the consequences of IFRS adoption?

Abstract

AbstractResearch Question/IssueThis study investigates whether the impact of the mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on earnings management practices varies between family and non‐family firms. Specifically, we examine the effects of different family ownership configurations and the CEO family identity.Research Findings/InsightsWe find that firms in Taiwan use less accrual‐based earnings management (ABEM) under the IFRS but more real earnings management (REM). On average, IFRS adoption is less likely to result in upward ABEM and REM in family firms than in non‐family firms. However, family firms with greater family ownership, lower family cash–vote divergence, a founder CEO, or a professional CEO are more likely to promote the positive effect of the IFRS on ABEM and mitigate the negative effect of the IFRS on REM. Furthermore, these firms are less likely to substitute ABEM with REM after the transition to the IFRS.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWhile recent literature has paid increasing attention to various governance characteristics that shape management's reporting incentives and, thus, affect the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, we focus on family firms in which the principal–principal agency relationship between controlling owners and other shareholders is salient. We highlight the effect of family owners' different agency features in relation to a structural change in the accounting regime.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study addresses how a firm's corporate governance influences the net benefits of implementing new accounting standards. Our evidence offers insights to policymakers and capital market participants, showing that variations in family owners' reporting incentives may have different impacts on the consequences of adopting the IFRS.