Affiliation:
1. Department of Philosophy UC Riverside Riverside CA USA
Abstract
ABSTRACTFollowing Bratman, I distinguish between the Cummins or component‐function of the planning capacity (its role as a component of larger forms of practical organizations) and its Wright or existence‐function – the planning capacity's effect that explains its existence. I agree with Bratman that these functions are distinct. The planning capacity's role within larger practical organizations need not explain its origin. But I argue that the distinction is less stark for future‐oriented existence‐functions, which concern the future persistence and stability of the capacity. In mature practical organizations, component‐functions usually give rise to matching future‐oriented existence‐functions, given that pressures for the persistence of practical organizations transfer to their components (such as the planning capacity) because of their component‐functions. But in the special case of individual temporally extended agency, there is an even stronger alignment of functions. The planning capacity and individual temporally extended agency are part of an inextricable package. The capacity is not just a distinct component. This entails that, within individual agency, the two functions merge and the planning capacity is the primary rather than the derivative target of pressures of persistence, care, and value. Or so I speculatively conjecture.