What it is to see: Artificial vision as constitutive interaction

Abstract

AbstractVisual prosthesis (VP) devices—devices that electrically stimulate the visual system with the goal of restoring vision to individuals who have lost it—are the literal construal of the orthodox theory of vision that holds that perception is an “indirect” process. In this theory, vision is an image‐ and sensation‐based reconstructive process of representation: a type of information processing that is medium‐independent. In this article, I draw on four years of ethnographic research with both designers and users of VP devices to demonstrate that there are large discrepancies between expectations for these devices and actual recipient experiences. I argue that the failure of the devices stems in part from the problematic theory of vision that informed their design and implementation. I introduce an alternative theory of vision based on the work of empirical psychologist James J. Gibson that sees perception as the “direct” product of a constitutive interaction between a perceiver and environment in a perceiver‐environment system. I show how a theory of perception as constitutive interaction (PCI) is more congruous with recipient reports and enables us to see that “artificial vision,” or the perceptual experience associated with the VP, is a unique perceptual phenomenon.