The Gatekeeper

Abstract

Gatekeepers control access to benefits that they do not own. When granted access, their clients incur obligations that take the form of fees owed to the gatekeeper. This paper examines a variety of forms that gatekeeping has historically taken, looking closely at the network positions that gatekeepers have occupied. Not previously resolved is what determines the size of the client's obligation. The theory presented here predicts 1) the size of that obligation from the value to the client of the access sought. It also predicts that 2) to benefit, gatekeepers must monopolize their positions, or, failing monopolization, 3) must organize to form a shared monopoly. In exchange networks, gatekeeping takes the form of “ordering,” a new structural power condition. Resistance equations generate exact quantitative values for hypotheses expressing the three predictions above. Experimental tests in the well-understood context of exchange networks offer strong support for the hypotheses.