Affiliation:
1. Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science University of California Irvine Irvine California USA
Abstract
AbstractThe mature Wittgenstein's groundbreaking analyses of sense and the logical must—and the powerful new method that made them possible—were the result of a multi‐year process of writing, re‐arranging, re‐writing and one large‐scale revision that eventually produced the Philosophical Investigations and RFM I. In contrast, his struggles during the same period with questions of arithmetic and higher mathematics remained largely in first‐draft form, and he drops the topic entirely after 1945. In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein's new method can be applied to the cases of arithmetic and set theory and that the result is innovative, recognizably Wittgensteinian, and independently appealing. I conclude by acknowledging the reasons Wittgenstein himself might have had to resist applying his own proven method to the case of mathematics—particularly to set theory—and by indicating why I think those reasons are ultimately unsound.