Affiliation:
1. The University of Chicago Chicago Illinois USA
Abstract
AbstractThis is a reply to ‘Defending Wittgenstein’, Piotr Dehnel's critique of my article, ‘Defending Wittgenstein's Remarks on Cantor from Putnam’. I first show that my position is much more in agreement with Felix Mühlhölzer than Dehnel takes it to be, and that his criticism of me is nothing more than a failure to recognize this. I then show how Dehnel incorrectly reads Wittgenstein as rejecting set theory as false. It is an overemphasis on and a much too narrow picture of ‘applicability’ which leads him to this view. Finally, I conclude by rejecting Dehnel's view that Wittgenstein was a finitist about mathematics.
Reference17 articles.
1. Bold Philip. (2022). ‘Three Essays on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics: Reality Determination & Infinity.’ PhD diss. The University of North Carolina.
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3. Dehnel Piotr. (2023). ‘Defending Wittgenstein.’Philosophical Investigations47(1):137–149.
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