Can institutions explain mass violence? Amhara ‘settler’ discourse and Ethiopia's ethnic federalism

Abstract

AbstractThis paper begins by reviewing rational choice institutionalism's explanation of how political institutions incentivise patronage networks emphasising ethnic cleavage. Acknowledging the limits of rationalist institutionalism in explaining societal norm constructions and mass behaviour, the paper then adopts discursive institutionalism to analyse the social affects of institutional design. The case study of violence against Amharas deemed ‘settlers’ in Ethiopia's contemporary ethnic federation highlights how new cleavages create new norms and new historical narratives, influencing group dynamics. These dynamics result in group‐based mass violence when rents‐based orders and patronage networks collapse during times of institutional instability or change. Thus, precipitated by the discursive effects of hyper‐ethnicised institutional design, mass violence against Amhara in different ethnic regions in Ethiopia emerges as an unexpected outcome of regime change and democratic transition in the country. These incidents of targeted violence are not simply explained by institutions, but rather by the socio‐political climate effected by the interaction between institutions and discourse under ethnic federalism. In short, this study demonstrates how institutions go beyond incentivising or constraining elite behaviour, producing discursive markers that normalise violence during periods of institutional ‘lapse’, when formal provisions of social order temporarily collapse.