Affiliation:
1. Universität Duisburg‐Essen, Institut für Philosophie Essen
Abstract
AbstractI argue that “general pejoratives” such as “jerk” or “bastard” differ crucially from items such as “that damn N”. While items such as the latter typically serve to give vent to one's attitudes, general pejoratives essentially involve judgments about a person's behaviour or character. This is particularly evident in cases where pejoratives occur not as epithets, but as predicate nominals. If we want to account for the overall contribution of words such as “jerk”, there are three kinds of content that ought to be distinguished: truth‐conditional contents, evaluative presuppositions, and expressive contents that are either at‐issue (in the case of expressive predicates) or non‐at‐issue (in the case of epithets).
Funder
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft