REGULATORY FORBEARANCE AND DEPOSITOR MARKET DISCIPLINE: EVIDENCE FROM SAVINGS BANKS IN KOREA-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

REGULATORY FORBEARANCE AND DEPOSITOR MARKET DISCIPLINE: EVIDENCE FROM SAVINGS BANKS IN KOREA

Published:2013-06-20 Issue:1 Volume:32 Page:203-218
ISSN:1074-3529
Container-title:Contemporary Economic Policy
language:en
Short-container-title:

Author:

CHOI HYOSOON,SOHN WOOK

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Public Administration,Economics and Econometrics,General Business, Management and Accounting

Reference41 articles.

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3. “Forbearance and Valuation of Deposit Insurance as a Callable Put.”;Allen;Journal of Banking and Finance,1993

4. “Uninsured Deposits and the Too-Big-to-Fail Policy in 1984 and 1991.”;Athavale;American Business Review,2000

5. Barajas , A. R. Steiner N. Salazar “Interest Spreads in Banking in Colombia, 1974-96.” 1999 196 224.

Cited by 5 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Bank risk‐taking and market discipline: Evidence from CoCo bonds in Korea;Journal of Futures Markets;2020-01-30

2. When time is not on our side: The costs of regulatory forbearance in the closure of insolvent banks;Journal of Banking & Finance;2017-07

3. Cooperative banks, the internet and market discipline;Journal of Co-operative Organization and Management;2016-12

4. When Time is Not on Our Side: The Costs of Regulatory Forbearance in the Closure of Insolvent Banks;SSRN Electronic Journal;2015

5. Factors Driving the Prompt Corrective Action of Supervisory Authorities: Evidence from Korea’s Savings Banks;Emerging Markets Finance and Trade;2014-11