Optimal Design of Revenue‐Maximizing Position Auctions with Consumer Search-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Optimal Design of Revenue‐Maximizing Position Auctions with Consumer Search

Published:2021-05-18 Issue:9 Volume:30 Page:3297-3316
ISSN:1059-1478
Container-title:Production and Operations Management
language:en
Short-container-title:Prod Oper Manag

Author:

Chen Ying‐Ju¹^ORCID

Affiliation:

1. School of Business and Management & School of Engineering The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Clear Water Bay Kowloon Hong Kong

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Management of Technology and Innovation,Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering,Management Science and Operations Research

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/poms.13437

Reference28 articles.

1. Skewed Bidding in Pay-per-Action Auctions for Online Advertising

2. Ordered Consumer Search

3. Position Auctions with Consumer Search

4. Bernard J.2019.Google Move to First Price Auction: Market Effects and Best Practices for Publishers. Available athttps://blog.adomik.com/google‐move‐to‐first‐price‐auction‐market‐effects‐and‐bestpractices‐for‐publishers‐part‐1‐of‐4/(accessed date August 10 2019).

5. Bishop T.2019.What a Google First‐Price Auction Means for Digital Publishers. Available athttps://blog.adomik.com/google‐move‐to‐first‐price‐auction‐market‐effects‐and‐bestpractices‐for‐publishers‐part‐1‐of‐4/(accessed date August 10 2019).

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