Affiliation:
1. João Costa‐NetoProfessor of Law at the University of Brasilia (UnB) District Court Judge in the State of São Paulo, Brazil
2. Faculty of Law University of Brasilia Campus Universitário Darcy Ribeiro, Asa Norte Brasília 70904970
3. Henrique Porto de CastroPh.D. candidate at the University of Brasilia (UnB)
Abstract
AbstractAfter the publication of Hart's Concept of Law, Dworkin published his article “The Model of Rules,” dividing positivism into two varieties: inclusive and exclusive. Many theorists involved in this debate have characterized Hart's position as inclusivist, which we reject in this article. We argue that Hart, in the postscript to The Concept of Law, conceded a point to Dworkin in accepting that inclusive positivism would imply the existence of objective moral standing, adopting a more “neutral” position—compatible with inclusive and exclusive positivism—and consequently distancing himself from the incorporation thesis, which is paramount to inclusive positivism.
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