Affiliation:
1. University of Regensburg, Regensburg , Germany
Abstract
AbstractFinancial intermediaries are, by definition, engaged in two-sided competition. Despite the well-known problems of achieving competitive solutions under twosided price competition, models of financial intermediation are commonly solved for competitive equilibria. This article provides a game-theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in one of the most important models of financial intermediation, the seminal Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model of the credit market with a continuum of borrower types.
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
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