Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous Equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous Equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy

Published:1999-02 Issue:1 Volume:34 Page:119-136
ISSN:0732-8516
Container-title:The Financial Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Financial Review

Author:

Chen Carl R.,Steiner Thomas L.

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Finance

Link

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6288.1999.tb00448.x/fullpdf

Reference39 articles.

1. Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers

2. Managerial Ownership, Debt Policy, and the Impact of Institutional Holdings: An Agency Perspective

3. The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities

4. On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence

5. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments

Cited by 139 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Climate change exposure, financial development, and the cost of debt: Evidence from EU countries;Journal of Financial Stability;2024-10

2. Corporate governance and capital structure dynamics: evidence from an emerging market;International Journal of Managerial Finance;2024-07-23

3. Control rights and cash dividends: A moderating effect of product market competition;Finance Research Letters;2024-07

4. Corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from political instability, political ideology, and corporate governance reforms in Pakistan;Economics & Politics;2024-07

5. Carbon consciousness: The influence of CEO ownership;Journal of Environmental Management;2024-07