Affiliation:
1. Institute for Six‐Sector Economy Fudan University China
2. Institute for Advanced Research Shanghai University of Finance and Economics China
Abstract
AbstractAbout 40% of workers find their jobs through referrals. We distinguish between two types of referrals based on whether the referrer works at the hiring firm (internal referrals) or not (external referrals). Interestingly, jobs found through internal (external) referrals pay more (less) than those found through formal methods. An equilibrium labor market model is then built by introducing an incentive‐compatible mechanism through which workers can share job opening information. A nondegenerate wage distribution arises in equilibrium with a wage premium (penalty) for internal (external) referrals. When calibrated, our model can capture these salient features of the U.S. labor market.
Funder
China Postdoctoral Science Foundation
Subject
Economics and Econometrics