1. I thank George Klosko, Ryan Pevnick, and the Editors ofPhilosophy & Public Affairsfor very helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
2. Beyond the Harm Principle
3. In describing Ripstein's sovereignty principle as "Kantian," I am following his own lead (p. 216, n. 1). I am less sure than Ripstein that his proposal follows from or faithfully represents Kant's own doctrine. But whatever Kant himself would have made of it, Ripstein's general position undoubtedly reflects a dominant strand in liberal thought that (rightly or wrongly) oftenclaimsa Kantian inspiration. The contemporary exponents of this variant of liberalism postulate a highest-order moral duty to safeguard the dignity of autonomous persons. They treat that duty as prior to and independent of utilitarian considerations and directly derive from it categorical limits on the legitimate scope of state power. Ripstein's view clearly exemplifies "Kantian liberalism" in this weaker sense, and this is how I use that term here.
4. J. S. Mill,Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, ed. H. B. Acton (London: Everyman, 1972), p. 56.
5. Mill, p. 56.