Abstract
The relationship between facts and values—in particular, naturalism and normativity—poses an ongoing challenge for feminist science studies. Some have argued that the fact/value holism of W.V. Quine's naturalized epistemology holds promise. I argue that Quinean epistemology, while appropriately naturalized, might weaken the normative force of feminist claims. I then show that Quinean epistemic themes are unnecessary for feminist science studies. The empirical nature of our work provides us with all the naturalized normativity we need.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Philosophy,Gender Studies
Cited by
9 articles.
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1. Feminist Philosophy of Science;2024-05-28
2. Feminist Empiricism;Companion to Feminist Studies;2020-11-27
3. Novelty;Climate Technology, Gender, and Justice;2018-12-15
4. The Naturalism Question in Feminism;The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism;2016-02-05
5. Feminist Radical Empiricism, Values, and Evidence;Hypatia;2016