Affiliation:
1. Institute for Neural Computation Ruhr‐University Bochum
Abstract
AbstractHow situated embodied agents may achieve goals using knowledge is the classical question of natural and artificial intelligence. How organisms achieve this with their nervous systems is a central challenge for a neural theory of embodied cognition. To structure this challenge, we borrow terms from Searle's analysis of intentionality in its two directions of fit and six psychological modes (perception, memory, belief, intention‐in‐action, prior intention, desire). We postulate that intentional states are instantiated by neural activation patterns that are stabilized by neural interaction. Dynamic instabilities provide the neural mechanism for initiating and terminating intentional states and are critical to organizing sequences of intentional states. Beliefs represented by networks of concept nodes are autonomously learned and activated in response to desired outcomes. The neural dynamic principles of an intentional agent are demonstrated in a toy scenario in which a robotic agent explores an environment and paints objects in desired colors based on learned color transformation rules.
Funder
Leverhulme Trust
H2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions