Affiliation:
1. Claremont McKenna College Claremont California USA
Abstract
AbstractIn this paper I explore three challenges to the morality of belief. First, whether we have the necessary control over our beliefs to be held responsible for them, i.e., the challenge of doxastic involuntarism. Second, the question of whether belief is really the attitude that we care about in the cases used to motivate the morality of belief. Third, whether attitudes weaker than belief, such as credence, can wrong, I then end by turning to how answers to the previous challenges suggest a way of extending the morality of belief to encompass a way of thinking of the moral mind more generally.
Cited by
17 articles.
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1. Hazards;The Architecture of Blame and Praise;2024-10-10
2. Functions;The Architecture of Blame and Praise;2024-10-10
3. Asymmetries;The Architecture of Blame and Praise;2024-10-10
4. Introduction;The Architecture of Blame and Praise;2024-10-10
5. List of Tables;The Architecture of Blame and Praise;2024-10-10