A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Published:2018-11-30 Issue:2 Volume:60 Page:517-545
ISSN:0020-6598
Container-title:International Economic Review
language:en
Short-container-title:International Economic Review

Author:

Aruoba S. Borağan¹,Drazen Allan¹²,Vlaicu Razvan³⁴

Affiliation:

1. University of MarylandU.S.A.

2. NBERU.S.A.

3. CEPRU.K.

4. Inter‐American Development BankU.S.A.

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/iere.12361

Reference37 articles.

1. Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits

2. Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work

3. Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians

4. Political Economy: Institutions Information Competition and Representation 1993 Cambridge University Press New York NY J. Banks R. Sundaram W. Barnett M. J. Hinich N. J. Schofield Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated Elections Model 295 311

5. The control of politicians: An economic model

Cited by 11 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Can term limits reduce political sabotage? Evidence from negative campaigning in gubernatorial races;SSRN Electronic Journal;2024

2. Out of Office, Out of Step? Re-election Concerns and Ideological Shirking in Lame Duck Sessions of the U.S. House of Representatives;SSRN Electronic Journal;2024

3. Discipline by turnout;Economics of Governance;2023-08-31

4. Better to be direct? Evidence from the abolition of direct elections in Italian local governments;Economics & Politics;2023-05-18

5. Career Concerns and the Dynamics of Electoral Accountability;American Journal of Political Science;2022-11-09