All Containment and No Engagement: Australia's Contemporary Policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Abstract

Australia's interactions with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), henceforth known as North Korea, have ebbed and flowed throughout their seventy‐five‐year history. In times of détente on the Korean Peninsula, Australia actively engaged North Korea and sought to facilitate its integration into the international system. However, during the recent détente in 2018–2019, Canberra broke with tradition and watched on as Trump, Moon, and Kim sought to negotiate a deal towards Pyongyang's denuclearisation. Why has Australia not followed its security partners and engaged, despite being an Indo‐Pacific middle power and an advocate for non‐proliferation? Answers to this question remain unknown in the international relations literature. Therefore, I conducted process tracing and identified seven “critical junctures” in Australia's relationship with North Korea while analysing its responses using middle power theory. Australia's preference for non‐engagement is due to a shift towards a “maximum pressure” policy reliant on sanctions, reducing incentives to engage. This stems from a normative objection to Pyongyang's violation of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and limited material capabilities to persuade North Korea to denuclearise unilaterally. I aim to give an up‐to‐date account of Australia‐North Korea relations and draw attention to a neglected area in Australia's non‐proliferation policy.