Self‐other agreement and criterion‐related validity of moral pride and hubris

Abstract

AbstractObjectivesThis research investigates the moral implications oftrait‐levelmoral pride and hubris, addressing prior limitations by gathering data from multiple sources. We raise two interrelated questions: (1) Do well‐acquainted peers agree with their friends on judgments of trait‐level moral pride and hubris? (2) Are moral pride and hubris related to divergent (im)moral outcomes, regardless of measurement sources?MethodWe collected data from a sample of university students and their friends (N = 173 dyads) in Hong Kong to examine self‐other agreement and criterion‐related validity of trait‐level moral pride and hubris.ResultsOur findings reveal a medium‐to‐large level of self‐other agreement for, as well as a moral divergence of, trait‐level moral pride and hubris. Notably, self‐reports of moral pride predict prosocial behavior, whereas self‐reports of moral hubris predict virtue‐signaling behavior, regardless of whether the outcomes are self‐ or other‐reported. Moreover, self‐reports trump other‐reports in predicting some outcomes, but the reverse is true for other outcomes.ConclusionsOur findings suggest that individuals' proneness to experience morally specific pride and hubris constitutes “real” traits, evoking divergent (im)moral outcomes. Furthermore, self‐ and other‐reports each contain some unique trait‐relevant information, with their relative predictive power depending on the specific predictor and outcome.