Delegation in Democracy: A Temporal Analysis*-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Delegation in Democracy: A Temporal Analysis*

Published:2020-09-09 Issue:3 Volume:29 Page:305-329
ISSN:0963-8016
Container-title:Journal of Political Philosophy
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Political Philosophy

Author:

Downey Leah¹

Affiliation:

1. Government Harvard University

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Philosophy,Sociology and Political Science

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/jopp.12234

Reference52 articles.

1. Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics

2. Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence

3. Balls Ed JamesHowat andAnnaStansbury.2016.Central bank independence revisited: after the financial crisis what should a model central bank look like?M‐RCBG Associate Working Paper Series no. 67.

4. How have central banks implemented negative policy rates?;Bech Morten Linnemann;BIS Quarterly Review,2016

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