Affiliation:
1. Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft LMU München Germany
Abstract
AbstractUnlike the question of whether self‐deception can be understood on the model of other‐deception, the relationship between the two phenomena at the level of practice is hardly ever explored. Other‐deception can support self‐deception and vice versa. Self‐deception often affects not only the beliefs and behavior of the self‐deceiving person but also the beliefs and behavior of others who may become accomplices of self‐deception. As I will show, however, it is difficult to describe this supportive relationship between self‐deception and the deception of others without conceptual contradiction. While “deflationary” approaches offer a convincing way to avoid the so‐called paradoxes of self‐deception, they do not resolve the conceptual tensions that arise here. I conclude by outlining a solution.