Nietzsche on suffering and morality

Abstract

AbstractNietzsche claims that suffering is needed for achievement. Morality, he thinks, aims to end suffering, and so would end achievement. I argue that at best some achievements are partly caused by suffering. Nietzsche could get a more secure connection between suffering and achievement by arguing that some achievements are constituted in part by suffering. But in both the causal and constitutive cases, moralists do not condemn inflicting on oneself the suffering involved in achievement. Nietzsche could instead argue, more simply, that morality is mistaken to think suffering is bad. He could deploy a ‘conditionality’ view of organic wholes, on which the value of suffering changes when part of an achievement, to argue that in some cases, suffering is good. I argue that here the conditionality view is less plausible than Moore's view of organic wholes, on which suffering would remain bad.